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ABSTRACT
Despite  the  adoption  of  no-fault  Workers'  Compensation  legislation  in  most  states,  there  is
substantial litigation over the issue of employer liability for injury claims. We develop a sequential
asymmetric information model of liability disputes and estimate the model using data on injury
claims from the state of Minnesota. The key insight of our model is that when workers differ in their
costs of pursuing a injury claim, employers have an incentive to deny liability and force those with
higher costs to abandon their claim. Likewise, workers who expect a bigger return from pursuing
their claim are more likely to fight back when liability is denied. Estimates of the structural model
confirm that the decision rules of both parties depend on the expected costs and benefits of
continuing the dispute. The model provides a parsimonious but relatively successful explanation for
the distribution of liability disputes across different workers and types of injuries.
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1Barth and Hunt (1980) report that 5-10 percent of all WC claims nationwide are
formally contested.
     
2Smith (1989) argued that this behavior could explain the so-called “Monday effect” –
an elevated rate of WC claims on Mondays.  Later work by Card and McCall (1996) and
Derrig (2001) suggests that most of the Monday effect arises because of higher on-the-
job injury rates on that day. 
No fault Workersʹ Compensation was adopted in most states in the early 20
th
Century to eliminate costly litigation over liability for work-related injuries (Fishback
and Kantor, 2000).  Under an ideal no fault system, employers agree to pay Workersʹ
Compensation (WC) benefits for all work-related injuries, and employees forfeit their
right to sue in the event of an accident.  While the majority of WC claims are settled
without a dispute, in a surprising fraction of cases –  10 percent of  lost-time injury
claims  in Minnesota, for example – the employer refuses to accept liability for the
injury.
1  In many of these instances the injured worker retains a lawyer and pursues the
case through the WC dispute resolution system.  The associated litigation costs are
blamed by analysts for contributing to the rapid rise in WC premiums over the past two
decades (e.g., Long, 2004). 
One source of liability disputes is imperfect information on the cause of certain
types of injuries.  An employee who sustains a back injury off the job, for example, has
an incentive to claim that the injury arose at work.
2  Even in the absence of outright
fraud, employees who suffer injuries of unknown origin have an incentive to file an
injury claim to recover lost pay and medical costs.  Firms and insurance carriers have a
countervailing incentive to deny such claims, in the hope that some fraction of
claimants will simply go away.
In this paper we develop and test a simple model of the dispute process
involving the issue of primary liability for WC claims.  Specifically, we model the firmʹs
decision of when to ʺstart a fightʺ by denying liability for an injury claim, and the
workerʹs decision of when to ʺfight backʺ by contesting the denial and launching a2
     
3See Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) for a review of the literature on disputes in a
variety of legal settings.  Thomason (1994) and Falaris, Link and Staten (1995) have
examined disputes in workers’ compensation. Our analysis differs in that it takes a
structural estimation approach that explicitly models the decision making process. See
Kreider (1999)for an example of such an approach that was applied to the disability
insurance application process.  
formal dispute resolution process.
3  The key assumption in our model is that workers
differ in their willingness to fight back.  If employers cannot observe which particular
workers are more likely to contest a denied claim, an optimal strategy is to deny high-
cost injuries for which there is some probability that the worker will drop the claim. 
Injured workers with higher costs of fighting back will then be induced to drop their
cases or ʺsettle out-of-courtʺ, saving the firm some fraction of the cost of their claim.
Our empirical analysis utilizes a large sample of back injuries drawn from
Minnesota WC administrative files from the late 1980s.  We focus on back injuries
because of their relatively high cost, and because of the inherent uncertainty over
employersʹ liability for these injuries (Burton, 1992).  We develop a relatively simple
structural model that captures the sequential decisions of the firm and the worker.  The
model includes a rich set of observed covariates and allows for a flexible specification of
unobserved heterogeneity across dispute pairs. Consistent with the basic insight of our
theoretical model, we find that employers are more likely to deny liability for an injury
when there is a bigger expected payoff to “starting a fightʺ, and that workers are more
likely to respond by filing a claim petition when there is a bigger expected payoff to
“fighting back”.  We show that the model reproduces many of the observed features of
the data, including the distributions of indemnity payments from the employer to the
injured worker at the various settlement nodes, and the variation in average denial rates
across different demographic groups.   Finally, we use the model to consider the
implications of imposing a “tax” on the initiation of disputes.3
     
4The main type of benefits are ʺtemporary totalʺ benefits paid according to a
statutory formula (based on the pre-injury wage) for each lost work day.  Partial
benefits are also available for injured workers who can return to work on a reduced
work schedule.  These and other features of the Minnesota system are described in
Minnesota House of Representatives Research Department (1988).
     
5According to a study conducted by the Minnesota House of Representatives
Research Department (1988), the majority of denials arise over basic factual issues such
as whether the injury occurred at work.  An important minority of denials arise over
more subtle issues such as whether WC benefits are payable for stress-related diseases
or occupational injuries like carpal tunnel syndrome.
I.  Institutional Background: The Minnesota WC System
Employees who incur a work-related injury in Minnesota are entitled to Workersʹ
Compensation benefits for any injury that results in permanent disability or more than 3
lost work days.
4  Injured workers are also entitled to full reimbursement of their
medical treatment costs.  In the event of a lost-time injury, the employer (or the
employerʹs insurance carrier) has 14 days to either begin paying benefits or deny
liability by filing a ʺnotice of denialʺ with the appropriate administrative body (the
Department of Labor and Industry).  During the 1980s, 11 percent of all lost-time injury
claims in the state and a similar percentage of back injuries were initially denied.
By filing a notice of denial the employer may be disputing the existence of an
injury, denying that it arose in the course of employment, or otherwise challenging the
compensability of the injury.
5  In any event, once the employer has filed a notice of
denial, an employee who wishes to contest the denial normally retains an attorney and
then may seek a direct settlement with the insurance company.  Failing this, the injured
worker formally initiates the dispute resolution process by filing a ʺclaim petitionʺ (CP)
with the Department of Labor and Industry.  Just over one quarter of all denied back
injury claims in the 1980s resulted in the subsequent filing of a claim petition.
Once a claim petition is filed, the dispute can be either referred to non-binding
mediation by the Department of Labor and Industry, or scheduled for an administrative4
     
6The formal dispute resolution process is described in much more detail in
Minnesota House of Representatives Research Department (1988).
     
7The sample excludes some fraction of minor injuries that resulted in medical costs
but only 1 or 2 days of lost work time.  Employers can (and sometimes do) dispute their
liability for medical costs in such “medical only” claims.
     
8The payment amounts in the figure include all forms of benefits, including lump
sum amounts paid to resolve certain cases, as well as temporary total and permanent
partial benefits.
conference conducted by a Departmental settlement judge.
6  Failing settlement at this
stage, the dispute moves to the state Office of Administrative Hearings, where cases are
heard in a formal setting by an administrative law judge.  The judge’s decision can be
appealed to the Workersʹ Compensation Court of Appeals.
Figure 1 gives some basic information on the first two stages of the dispute
process involving issues of primary liability for back injuries in Minnesota.  The data in
this figure are based on a 10 percent random sample of ʺfirst reportsʺ of injuries that
occurred between 1985 and 1989.  Employers routinely file a first report for any serious
injury that might result in an indemnity claim, and a first report is legally required for
any injury that actually leads to an indemnity payment (i.e., payments to the injured
worker for lost work time or as compensation for permanent disability).  Thus, the
sample frame includes all back injuries with positive indemnity benefits, as well as
some injuries that were filed on a first report but never generated an indemnity claim.
7
The figure shows the fraction of injury cases with positive payments and the
mean payment amounts for each of 3 possible denial/claim petition states: injuries
where the employer accepted liability; injuries where liability was denied and no claim
petition was filed; and injuries that were denied and for which a claim petition was
filed.
8  Overall, injured workers receive indemnity payments in 40 percent of denied
claims.  The probability of receiving a payment is relatively high for denied cases with a
claim petition (74 percent) but is far from negligible (25 percent) even for denied cases5
     
9WC payment amounts tend to be highly skewed.  Thus the median payment
amount in each denial/claim petition category is far below the mean.  The median
payment for non-denied cases is $632.  The median for denied and uncontested cases is
$1,273.  The median for denied and contested cases is $14,000.
     
10The decision to deny liability is normally made by the firmʹs insurance carrier. We
make no distinction between the firm and its carrier, although we recognize that the
divergent interests of principles and agents may be an important aspect of the dispute
process. See McCall (1990) for an application of this idea to the arbitration setting.
with no claim petition.  These numbers suggest that a significant fraction of denied
cases are eventually revealed to be valid injury claims.  Average payment amounts
conditional on having any payment are far higher for denied and contested cases than
for either of the other two categories, suggesting that liability disputes tend to involve
costly injuries.
9 
II. A Theoretical Model of Denials and Disputes
This section describes a simple theoretical model of disputes over employer
liability in the Minnesota WC system.  We model these disputes as the outcome of a
two-person sequential game in which the employer first decides whether to deny
liability, and the injured worker then decides whether to fight this decision.  We model
the post-claim petition process (i.e. the settlement conferences and administrative
hearings) as a ʺblack-boxʺ characterized by two parameters: B, the probability of a
positive payment to the worker; and 2, the average amount that is paid conditional on a
positive payment.
The game tree associated with the theoretical model is presented in Figure 2, and
corresponds directly to the payoff tree in Figure 1.  In the first stage of the game the firm
decides whether or not to deny liability.
10 If liability is accepted, the worker receives $2
and the game ends.  If the firm decides to deny liability, the firm incurs an immediate
cost $d and the game moves to the second stage.  In the second stage the worker must
decide whether to dispute a denial (i.e. ʺfight backʺ) or not.  If the worker fights, he or6
     
11This assumption is relaxed below.
she incurs a cost $c, and the game moves to the final ʺdispute resolutionʺ stage.  If the
worker decides not to fight, the game ends with no further payments from the firm to
the worker.
11  
For simplicity, we assume that both the employer and the employee observe the
injury characteristics 2 and B.  We assume, however, that there is asymmetric
information concerning the workerʹs cost of contesting a denial.  In particular, we
assume that each worker knows his or her own value of c whereas the employer knows
only the distribution of c, as summarized by a distribution function F (or a conditional
distribution function F(c*x) that depends on a set of observable characteristics x).  For
simplicity, we assume that both the worker and the firm are risk neutral, and we ignore
any delay between the stages of the game.  We also assume that all workers who suffer
an injury of a given class (2, B) actually file a WC claim.
The solution of the game is obtained by backward induction.  Once an injury is
denied, the worker will ʺfight backʺ if the expected utility of fighting exceeds the cost of
fighting, or if  B2 > c.  The firm will deny liability if its expected costs given that it
denies liability are lower than the cost of accepting liability.  The probability that the
worker fights is F(B2), the expected cost to the firm if the worker fights is  B2 +  d, and
the expected cost to the firm if the worker decides not to fight is d.  Hence, the firm will
deny the claim if
(1) F(B2)@B2 + d  <  2 . 
Inspection of equation (1) shows that denials arise in this simple model for two reasons:
because of ex ante uncertainty over the likelihood of a liability determination in the
dispute resolution process (i.e. B < 1); and because of heterogeneity in workersʹ costs of
pursuing a claim.  Even if B = 1, it may be optimal to deny a claim on the chance that an
injured worker with a higher value of c will ʺgo awayʺ rather than contest the denial. 7
     
12This asymmetry may arise if firms or insurers develop experience in dealing with
contested denials in the dispute resolution system.
     
13Note that if workers observe 2 and know that firms play pure strategies, then
workers can infer the realization of B from the firmʹs denial decision for any value of 2
for which the pure strategy denial decision is different given B = B
H or B = B
L. 
By the same token, even if c=0 (so F(B2)=1), when B is strictly less than 1 it is optimal to
deny all claims with sufficiently high expected costs, since there is some probability that
the firm will be found not liable for the injury in the final dispute resolution stage.
What if Firms are Better Informed?
Although this very simple model incorporates asymmetric information on
workersʹ costs of pursuing a claim, no real strategic play occurs because the informed
party (the worker) moves after the uniformed party (the firm).  A slight extension of the
model assumes that firms have better information than workers regarding the likely
outcome of the dispute resolution process.
12  This information structure leads to
equilibrium bluffing behavior, since employers who know that an injured worker is
likely to prevail if a denied claim is actually contested have an incentive to conceal their
information.
For example, suppose that B can take only two values, B
H > B
L, and that the firm
observes the realization of B while the worker doesnʹt.  In this game, workers will
update their beliefs about their chances of winning a contested denial after observing
the firmʹs denial decision.
13  This learning process will induce some firms with B = B
H to
ʺbluffʺ by denying liability, even though in the absence of asymmetric information on
the value of B a firm in the same situation would not deny the claim.  In particular, it
can be shown that the optimal strategy for a firm that observes B = B
H is a mixed
strategy, with a probability of denial that declines smoothly from 1 (for injuries with
expected cost 2 above some threshold) to 0 (for injuries with expected cost below some8
     
14Sieg (2000) uses a version of Nalebuff’s (1987) model to study the pre-trial outcomes
of malpractice suits.
     
15Contrary to the data, this simple adaptation of the Bebchuk-Nalebuff model also
implies that workers receive a positive payment in all denied cases that are settled
without a claim petition.  In the case of medical malpractice suits, Sieg (2000) shows that
the probability of a payment to the plaintiff, and the conditional mean for positive
payment, are both higher for cases that are settled out of court than for those that go to
trial (as would be expected in the Bebchuk-Nalebuff model).
threshold).  Such a mixed strategy equilibrium generates a higher rate of denials than
would arise in the same environment in the absence of asymmetric information about
B.
More Complex Game Structures
A second limitation of the model described in Figure 2 is the assumption that
claims that are denied and not contested generate no benefit payments.  As we noted in
the discussion of Figure 1, however, a quarter of denied and uncontested WC claims
generate positive payments to the injured worker.  One possibility is that these
payments represent the outcome of “pre-trial” negotiations between the firm and the
worker.  Bebchuk (1984) and Nalebuff (1987) present models of pre-trail negotiations
built on the assumption that the defendant (in our case, the employer) has superior
information on the likelihood of liability, and that prior to trial the plaintiff (in our case,
the worker) makes a single take-it or leave-it offer and proceeds to trial (i.e., files a claim
petition) if the offer is rejected.
14   Under this set-up, only employers with a relatively
low likelihood of liability proceed to trial, implying that the probability of a payment to
workers, and the mean payment size, will both be higher if the case is settled without a
claim petition then if it goes to the next stage of dispute resolution.  These predictions
are inconsistent with the patterns in Figure 1, suggesting that the structure of the
Bebchuk-Nalebuff model is inappropriate for our setting.
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An alternative assumption is that the parties receive some additional information
between the date of the injury and the deadline for filing a claim petition that can lead
the employer to accept liability, or induce the employee to drop his or her claim.  
Informal discussions with WC practitioners suggest that in cases where employers (or
insurers) have not received all the relevant information to assess a claim, they often file
a notice of denial to leave open the option of disputing the claim.    
Unfortunately, our data set does not allow us to identify cases where information
arrives late, or to distinguish between the types of settlements reached by the parties. 
We therefore make the simplifying assumption that regardless of the process that leads
to the outcomes for a denied but uncontested claim, the parties’ “reduced form” payoffs
to this node can be summarized by two variables: the probability of a positive payment,
and the distribution of payment amounts conditional on a positive payment for a
denied and uncontested claim.  This assumption leads to a set of decision rules that are
very similar to the ones described above.  In particular, suppose that the probability of a
positive payment if the claim is denied and contested is B1, and that the probability of a
positive payment if the claim is denied and not contested is B2 < B1.  Denote the
expected payment amounts (conditional on a positive payment) in these two cases by 21
and 22.  Then a worker with cost c of contesting a claim will file a claim petition if
(2) B121 > B222 + c ,
which occurs with probability p
c, where p
c = F( B121 - B222 ).
A similar issue arises in modeling the payments to workers for cases in which
liability is not denied.  Although most injured workers whose claim is not denied
receive some form of WC payments, about 10 percent receive nothing (see Figure 1). 
Most of the latter cases presumably represent injuries that involved less than 3 days of
lost work time.  To incorporate this possibility, let B3 represent the probability of a10
positive payment if a claim is not denied, and let 23 represent the associated payment
(conditional on a positive amount).  Then the firm will deny liability for the claim if
(3) p
c @ B121  +  (1-p
c) @ B222  + d  <  B323  .
This decision rule reduces to the simpler expression given by equation (1) above if B2 =
0, B3 = 1, and if 21 = 22 = 23 = 2.  More generally, if B2 > 0 or B3 < 1, or if the expected
payment amounts differ depending on the denial and claim petition status of the injury,
then these differences must be taken into account in the firmʹs denial decision. 
Empirical Implementation
To take this model to the data we need to specify the observed and unobserved
components of the payment probabilities (B1, B2, B3) and the conditional payment levels
(21, 22, 23).  We assume that the probabilities Bj are given by:
(4a)  Bj = M((jx) ,
where M(z) is the Gaussian distribution function evaluated at z, and x represents a set
of observed characteristics of the injury claim.  We assume the payment amounts 2j are
given by:
(4b) 2j  =  exp ( x$j  +  vj  +  ej ) ,   j=1,2,3 ,
where (v1, v2, v3) represent cost components that are observed by the parties but
unobserved by us, and the ej represent purely random payment components that are
unanticipated by the parties.  For simplicity, we assume that the ej’s are normally
distributed.  Conditional on (v1, v2, v3), the payment amounts are therefore log-normally
distributed. 
The two other ingredients of the theoretical model are the workerʹs cost of
contesting a claim c, and the firmʹs cost of denying a claim d.  We assume that these are
given by:
(5a) c  =  x$4  +  e4 ,11
(5b) d  =  x$5  +  e5 ,
where e4 and e5 are normally distributed with mean 0 and standard deviations s4 and s5,
respectively.  We assume that the error terms (e1, e2, e3, e4, e5) are mutually uncorrelated. 
Under these assumptions the expected payment amounts, conditional on denial
and claim petition status, are as follows:
         Denial/CP Status               Expected WC Payment Amount  
         denied, contested            E1 = M((1x)exp( x$1 + v1 + s1
2/2 )   
         denied, not contested        E2 = M((2x)exp( x$2 + v2 + s2
2/2 )
         not denied                   E3 = M((3x)exp( x$3 + v3 + s3
2/2 )
where we have made use of the formula for the expected value of a log-normally
distributed variable.  Conditional on a claim being denied, and on x and (v1, v2, v3),  a
worker will contest the denial if  E1 - E2 > c, which occurs with probability 
(6) p
c  =  M [  ( E1 - E2  -  x$4 ) / s4  ] .
The firm will deny a claim if p
cE1 + (1-p
c)E2 - E3 > d, which occurs with probability 
(7) p
d  =  M [  ( E3  !  p
cE1  !(1-p
c)E2  ! x$5 ) / s5  ] .
The likelihood function for the observed data, conditional on x and (v1, v2, v3),
consists of six parts, as follows:12
       Denial/CP Status/Payment                 Likelihood   
     
         not denied, no payment                (1-p
d) (1-B3)
         not denied, payment y               (1-p
d) B3 f3(y)
         denied, no CP, no payment            p
d (1-p
c) (1-B2)
         denied, no CP, payment y            p
d (1-p
c) B2 f2(y)
         denied, CP, no payment                 p
d p
c (1-B1)
         denied, CP, payment y                 p
d p
c B1 f1(y)
where fj(y) is the density function for a log-normally distributed variable with Mean
[log(y)] = x$j + vj, and Variance [log(y)] = sj
2.
As in other structural econometric models, a key issue is the parameterization of
the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity in the payout functions (v1, v2, v3).  We
assume that the vector (v1, v2, v3) has a point-mass distribution with a relatively small
number of points of support:  
Prob { (v1, v2, v3) = (v1k, v2k, v3k) } = qk,    for k=1,2....
This parameterization allows the unobserved heterogeneity components in (21, 22, 23)
to be arbitrarily correlated across injuries.   Each point of support contributes 4
additional parameters: 3 location parameters (v1k, v2k, v3k), and a probability qk.  The
overall likelihood of the observed data is then obtained by taking a probability-
weighted average of the likelihood for each point of support.
Evaluating the Model
The model represented by equations (4)-(7) is highly restrictive.  For example, it
ignores any unobserved heterogeneity in the probabilities (B1, B2, B3).  Morever,
depending on the exclusion restrictions imbedded in the parameter vectors $1 - $5, the
model imposes a number of restrictions on the way the observed covariates affect the13
B’s, the 2’s, and the probabilities p
d and p
c.  As we discuss in more detail below, in our
empirical work we include a unrestricted set of covariates in the models for the
probabilities of a positive payment, and for the conditional payment amounts,  but we
assume that the cost functions (5a) and (5b) depend on only a limited set of x’s.  Under
these assumptions, the x’s that are excluded from (5a) only effect p
c to the extent that
they shift E1 ! E2, whereas those that are excluded from (5b) only effect p
d to the extent
that they shift E3 !p
cE1 !(1!p
c)E2.  A natural way to test the model is to compare the
predicted and actual probabilities of denying a claim (or contesting a denied claim) by
characteristics that are not directly included in x$4 and x$5.  For example, if the costs c
and d are assumed to be independent of the cause and type of injury, then predicted
differences in denial rates by cause and type of injury can only arise through systematic
differences in the way that these characteristics affect the B’s, the 2’s.  A high
correlation between the actual and predicted denial rates for different causes and types
of injuries would therefore provide support for the assumed structure of the model. 
Another informal way to evaluate the specification is to compare the actual and
predicted distributions of payments for each of the three denial/claim petition states. 
As we show below, specifications with more points of support for the unobserved
heterogeneity vector (e.g. 5 points versus 1-3) provide a much better fit to the observed
distributions. 
Finally, a more formal test of the model can be obtained by testing the
restrictions on the functional forms of the denial and claim petition models.  In
particular, the theoretical model implies that the expected payment differentials E1 !E2 
and E3 !p
cE1 !(1!p
c)E2 enter the claim-petition filing equation and denial equation with
coefficients of unity.  As an alternative, suppose that the expected cost differentials are
discounted by factors *1 and *2, respectively.  Then the probabilities of contesting a
denial and denying a claim become  14
     
16Exclusion of some of the x’s from x$’4  and x$’5 is likely to increase the power of
these tests.  In the absence of such exclusions, the * parameters are essentially identified
by functional form.
(6a) p
c  =  M [  (  *1(E1 - E2)  -  x$4 ) / s4  ]
and
(7a) p
d  =  M [  (  *2(E3 !p
cE1 !(1!p
c)E2 )  -  x$5 ) / s5  ] ,
respectively.  Since s4 and s5 do not enter any of the other equations of the model, only
the coefficient ratios ( *1/s4,  $4/s4) and (*2/s5,  $5/s5) are identified. Under the assumptions
of our basic model,  *1 = *2 = 1 and therefore both *1/s4 and *2/s5 must be strictly
positive.  Under the alternative assumption that injured workers and employers have
non-forward-looking behavior (or that they base their choices on factors other than their
expected payoffs), it is reasonable to test that *1/s4 > 0 and  *2/s5 > 0.  This test provides a
useful check on the assumed structure of the model.  If either *1/s4 or *2/s5 is negative,
or insignificantly different from zero, we can infer that the model is mis-specified.
Closely related to this idea, note that equations (6a) and (7a) imply that p
c and p
d
depend only on the differences in expected payouts between the various outcome nodes.  
More generally, consider the alternative models:
(6b) p
c  =  M [ (*11 E1 ! *12 E2  !  x$4)/s4   ] ,
(7b) p
d  =  M [ (*21 E3   ! *22  p
cE1  !  *22(1!p
c)E2 ! x$5)/s5    ] .
The validity of our model and specification can be evaluated by testing that (*11/s4) =
(*12/s4)  and that (*21/s5)=(*22/s5)=(*23/s5).
16
III.  Data Description and Preliminary Analysis
Before turning to a formal econometric analysis of the model described in the
previous section, we present an overview of the Minnesota WC data and results from a
descriptive analysis of the decision processes of the two parties.  As noted earlier, our
main data source is a 10 percent random sample of the first reports of injuries filed with15
     
17These requirements eliminate about 10 percent of the sample.  The main missing
variable is the injured workerʹs weekly wage.  
the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry between 1985 and 1989.  We also have
information on 100 percent of the denied claims from the same time period, allowing us
to construct more accurate tallies for the subset of denied injuries.  Throughout this
paper, we analyze only those injury claims with valid (non-missing) data on the date of
the injury and the injured workerʹs gender and pre-injury wage.
17  Characteristics of the
resulting sample are presented in column 1 of Table 1.  We also present data for the
subsample of claims involving a back injury in column 2, and for back injuries by denial
status in columns 3 and 4.
The means in column 1 suggest that injured workers are relatively young,
predominantly male, and typically employed in blue-collar occupations. The
characteristics of workers with back injuries are fairly similar to those of the overall
sample (compare column 2 to column 1), as are the characteristics of workers with a
back injury whose claims were either denied or not (columns 3 and 4).  The industry
distributions for the various subgroups are shown in rows 6-9.  Again, these are not too
different, though service workers account for a larger fraction of back injuries than they
do of overall injuries, and injured construction workers appear to be less likely to have
their claim denied than those from other industries.  Rows 10-12 of the table show the
fraction of claims arising from firms with three key types of insurance arrangements:
self-insurance; insurance through the state-run competitive fund; and coverage through
the stateʹs assigned risk pool.  (The remainder of firms are insured with private
insurers).  Comparing the percentages in columns 2, 3, and 4, it appears that self-
insured firms have slightly higher denial rates than other insurers, while denial rates at
firms covered by the assigned risk pool are nearly twice as high as average.  Finally, the
bottom rows of Table 1 show mean denial rates and on the average indemnity16
payments associated with different types of injuries.  Employers denied liability for
approximately 11 percent of all injury claims filed in the late 1980s, and a very similar
fraction of back injuries.  As shown in rows 14 and 15, back injuries are more likely to
generate a positive indemnity payment to the injured worker, and are substantially
more costly than other injuries.
As we noted in the discussion of Figure 1, the probability of receiving WC
payments and the mean level of payments differ significantly between denied and non-
denied claims.  Although denied claims are less likely to generate payments, the mean
level of payments among denied claims with a positive payment is much higher.  Figure
3 shows smoothed estimates of the frequency distributions of log indemnity payments
(conditional on a positive payment) by denial status.  The entire distribution of
payments for denied claims is shifted to the right relative to the distribution for claims
that were not denied.  Interestingly, the distributions of log payments for both types of
claims are  bimodal.
Figure 4 presents similar plots of the conditional distributions of indemnity
payments for claims that were denied and not contested (left panel), or denied and
contested (right panel).   The two distributions are quite different: the mean payment
for denied and not contested cases (conditional on a positive amount) is  $5943, whereas
the mean for denied and contested claims is $18,956.   The non-contested denials have a
bimodal distribution similar to the overall distribution for non-denied cases, whereas
the denied and contested cases have a unimodal distribution centered close to the
second peak of the denied and uncontested cases.
Although back injuries constitute a relatively homogeneous subset of WC claims,
there are still significant differences in claim characteristics by the type and cause of the
injury.  Some of these differences are documented in Table 2, which presents claim
characteristics – including denial rates, CP-filing rates, and payment data – for 417
     
18We use the 100% sample of denied claims to construct the means for denied claims
shown in this table.
different injury types and 6 different injury causes.
18  Claims with either the type or
cause of the injury coded as unknown or missing have relatively high denial rates and
relatively low probabilities of a positive payment.  In cases where payments are made
for these injuries, however, the mean payment tends to be high.  Dislocation injuries are
also characterized by relatively high denial rates and higher-than-average CP-filing
rates, although the probability of payment for these injuries is not significantly lower
than average.  
We have also conducted a descriptive multivariate analysis of the probabilities
that a claim is denied, that a denied claim in contested, and that positive indemnity
payments are made conditional on denial and contest status.  We included in these
models information on the injured worker, on the injury type and cause, and on the
insurance arrangements of the firm (see Appendix Table 1). A key fact that arises from
these models is that denial rates vary substantially with insurance arrangements, with
the highest denial rates for firms in the Assigned Risk Pool.  Interestingly, differences in
denial rates across carriers are only partially explained by the nature of the injuries and
the types of workers covered by different carriers.   
Simple Descriptive Models
As a final step in our descriptive analysis we attempted to provide some simple
evidence on the empirical plausibility of the two key behavioral equations in our model. 
Equation (6) states that the probability that an injured worker contests a denial (p
c)
depends on the gap between the expected indemnity payment for a denied and
contested injury (E1) and for a denied and uncontested injury (E2).   Equation (7) states
that the probability the firm denies liability (p
d) depends on the gap between the18
     
19The four injury type and cause variables included in the models were selected after
considerable experimentation, and generally give as good a fit as a complete set of
indicators for the injury type and cause.
     
20During the time period under consideration, the temporary total disability benefit schedule
in Minnesota set replacement rates equal to 67 percent for many workers, but because of
minimum and maximum benefit rates and other features, replacement rates could range from
substantially below 67% (for high-wage workers) to over 100% (for low-wage workers).  The
dummies indicate whether the replacement rate is 67%, between 67% and 100%, equal to 100%,
or over 100%, with an omitted category for replacement rates under 67%.
indemnity payment for a non-denied claim (E3) and the expected payment if the claim is
denied ( p
cE1 + (1-p
c)E2 ).  To evaluate these hypotheses, we began by fitting a set of 
probit and linear regression models for the probability of a positive payment, and total
payment amount (if positive) for injury claims that were denied and contested, denied
but not contested, and not denied.  Each of the 6 models included 29 explanatory
variables: linear and quadratic terms in age, indicators for gender and marital status, an
indicator for a blue collar occupation, the log of the pre-injury weekly wage, 4
indicators for injuries of various types and causes, 3 indicators for insurance type (self-
insured firms, those in the State Fund, and those in the Assigned Risk Pool with the
omitted category being a private carrier), 4 dummies for WC benefit replacement rate,
and dummies for 1-digit industry and year.
19 
,20  We then used these models to estimate
the expected payment amounts E1, E2, E3 for each injury in the sample.  We also fit a
simple  probit model for the probability that the worker filed a claim petition if the
injury was denied with the same set of 29 observed covariates.  The full set of models is
reported in Appendix Tables 1 and 2.
For all the injuries that were denied, we then used a local linear regression
procedure to estimate the relationship between (E1!E2) and the probability that the
injured worker contested the denial.  The resulting fit is shown in Figure 5.  Note that
the estimated expected gain to contesting a denial is nearly always positive, with a 10
th
percentile value of $4,800 and a 90
th percentile value of $17,016.  Consistent with the19
basic insight of our model, the probability of contesting a claim is an increasing function
of the expected payoff.   Of course this finding has to be interpreted carefully, because
(unlike the results from our full model, presented below) the calculation of (E1!E2)
ignores any correlation between the unobserved determinants of E1 and E2, and
resulting selectivity bias in the payment amounts observed for the two types of
settlements.  
Next, we used our estimates of E1, E2, and E3, together with the unrestricted
probit estimate of p
c, to form an estimate of the payoff to the firm of denying liability. 
We then used a local linear regression procedure to estimate the relationship between
the payoff (E3!p
cE1!(1!p
c)E2) and the probability of denying liability.  The results are
shown in Figure 6.  Interestingly, for many injuries this simple procedure suggests that
the expected payoff to denying liability is negative.  Over most of the range of the data
the probability of denying liability is positively related to the firm’s expected payoff for
denial, confirming the prediction of our model.  Again, we stress that this simple
evidence has to be interpreted carefully in light of the potential effects of unobserved
heterogeneity in the payoffs.  Nevertheless, we view the results in Figures 5 and 6 as
supportive of the basic structure of our model.
IV.  Structural Estimation of a the Model
Estimation Results
We fit a series of versions of our structural model with different numbers of
points of support for the unobserved heterogeneity distribution, including a baseline
model with no heterogeneity, and specifications with 2, 3, and 5 mass points.  Using the
Akaike information criterion, we found that the 5 mass point model provided the best
fit to the data.  Following up on the discussion in Section II, we also compared the
predicted and actual distributions of log indemnity payments implied by the alternative20
     
21The actual distributions presented in Figures 5 - 7 where smoothed using kernel
density estimation with a Gaussian kernel and a bandwidth of 0.30.
models at each outcome node.  The results of these comparisons are summarized in
Figures 7 through 9, which show the predicted and actual log cost distributions for
injury claims that were accepted without denial, denied and contested, and denied and
not contested, respectively, from each of the four alternative model specifications.
21  As
can be seen from these figures, the 5 mass point model is the only specification that
successfully reproduces the bimodal log cost distributions for claims that were accepted
without denial and for claims that were denied and not contested. 
Parameter estimates from this specification are presented in Table 3.  The first
panel of the table reports the estimates for equations (6) and (7) – the models for the
probability of denying a claim, and contesting a denied claim, respectively.  The second
panel presents the estimates of equations (4b), which specify the conditional claim
amounts 21,  22, and 23 for each of the three possible ending states.   Finally, the third
panel of Table 3 presents estimates of the models for the probability of a positive
payment in each state (i.e., the models for B1, B2, and B3).   The models for 2j and Bj
(j=1,2,3) include a total of 13 covariates: a linear and quadratic term in age, a gender
dummy, a dummy for blue collar occupation, log pre-injury weekly wage, controls for 4
different causes/types of injuries, and a set of 4 dummies indicating the WC benefit
replacement rate.   The latter variables are included to capture the possibility that claim
durations (and hence injury claim costs) are affected in part, by the relative generosity
of WC benefits (Thomason, 1994).  
In contrast to the unrestricted nature of the models for 2j and Bj, we include only
a few selected control variables in the contest and denial models (equations 6 and 7,
respectively).  Recall that control variables enter these equations only to the extent that
they affect the firm’s cost of denying an injury, d,  or the worker’s cost of contesting a21
claim, c.  We assume that denial costs vary with the worker’s wage, and with the firm’s
insurance carrier.  Based on evidence from Appendix Table 1, and some
experimentation, we decided to include only 3 insurance carrier dummies. On the
employee side, we assume that the cost of contesting a claim varies with a worker’s
wage, and with age and marital status.  For our basic specifications we assume that
employees discount the expected monetary payoff to contesting a denial by a factor of
*1, and that employers discount the expected payoff to denying a claim by a factor *2.
Strictly speaking,  the estimated discount factors shown in Table 3 are estimates of *1/s4
and  *2/s5.  
The parameter estimate for the discount factor in the denial equation (see column
1 in the first panel of Table 3) suggests that employers are forward-looking, in the sense
that an increase in the expected gain from denying a claim significantly increases the
probability that the claim will be denied.   Evaluated at the sample means for the
various payouts this estimate implies that a 10% reduction in p
c (the probability that a
claimant will contest a denied claim) raises the probability of denial by 78% (from 11 to
18 percent).  Thus, employers appear to be more likely to deny claimants that have a
lower probability of “fighting back”.   The corresponding estimate of *1 in the contest
equation (column 2) is also positive and statistically significant, suggesting that injured
workers are similarly forward looking.   Using the mean values for the payouts at the
various outcome stages, the estimate of 7.868 implies that a $1000 increase in the
expected benefits of contesting a denial increases the probability of fighting back by
9.9% (from about 25 to 28 percent).  The other parameter estimates in the denial
equation suggest that claims from more highly-paid workers are more likely to be
denied, and that self insured employers and those in the assigned risk pool are more
likely to deny a claim than those with private coverage, while employers in the state
fund are less likely to deny a claim.  The parameter estimates in the contest decision22
model suggest that there is a “check-shaped” age profile in the willingness to contest a
denied injury, with the strongest likelihood of contesting a denial among older workers. 
Married workers are also somewhat more likely to contest a denial. 
Turning to the parameter estimates for the conditional payment amounts and the
payment probabilities, notice that the age, gender, blue collar, and wage effects have a
complex pattern across the six equations.  One consistent finding is that higher-wage
workers have more costly indemnity claims, conditional on a positive payment.  Since
temporary total disability benefits are proportional to pre-injury wages (subject to
various minimums and maximums) this makes sense.  Offsetting the higher payment
amounts conditional on a positive payment, however, the probability of receiving an
indemnity payment is lower for more highly paid workers in two of the three outcome
stages. Female workers are more likely to receive positive payouts at any stage of the
process, although the effects are not very large.   The age effects on the probabilities of a
positive payout, and on the conditional amount of the payout, are also relatively small
and unsystematic.
While lost time indemnity payments in Minnesota are based on simple two-
thirds replacement rate formula, there is a lot of variation in the actual replacement rate,
induced by the presence of minimum and maximum benefit rules.  Claimants with
higher benefit rates may have less incentive to return to work in a timely fashion after
suffering an injury (Krueger, 1990;   Meyer et al. 1995).  They may also have a greater
incentive to file claims with questionable validity, since if they are successful they
receive a larger WC payment relative to the opportunity cost of working at their pre-
injury wage.  These observations have led some observers to hypothesize that
employers are more likely to deny claims filed by workers with higher benefit
replacement rates (e.g., Thomason, 1994).  23
     
22The schedule for temporary total disability payments in Minnesota in the late 1980s
included a two-step minimum: an unconditional minimum (which could result in a
replacement rate over 1) and a conditional minimum (which resulted in a significant
subset of workers receiving a replacement rate of exactly 1).
To evaluate the potential impacts of differing replacement rates on the various
payout components in our model, we included a total of 4 dummy variables, indicating
whether the injured worker’s replacement rate was greater than 1, exactly equal to 1,
between 2/3 and 1, or exactly equal to 2/3.
22  The omitted category is for workers with
replacement rates under 2/3: these are the workers affected by the maximum benefit
provision.   The estimated models for the probability of a positive payment (in the third
panel of Table 3) show an interesting pattern of effects associated with these dummies. 
The probabilities of an indemnity payment if the claim is accepted, or denied and
contested, are both monotonically decreasing in the replacement rate.  For claims that
are denied and not contested the probability of a positive payment is less strongly
related to the replacement rate, though it appears that workers with replacement rates
under 2/3 have the lowest likelihood of a positive payment in this case.   To
summarize the implied effects of variation in the replacement rate on the observed
behavior of the parties, we calculated for each injury claim the predicted probability
that the claim was denied, and contested if denied, under the assumption that the 
injured worker’s replacement rate was equal to either 2/3 or 1.  We then averaged these
predicted probabilities across all workers in the sample.  The results, shown in the
following table, suggest that higher replacement rates are indeed associated with a
higher probability of claim denial, but with relatively little change in the probability of
contesting a denied claim:24
Replacement Rate = 2/3 Replacement Rate = 1
))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
P(Claim Denied) 0.12 0.30
P(Contested | Denied) 0.29 0.31
Note that the implied effects of the replacement rate on denial and contest behavior
work through the implicit cost calculations of the parties: our denial and contest models
exclude any direct effect of the replacement rate.
Evaluating the Model
To test the adequacy of our structural model, we examined whether the
predicted distribution of denials across different injury cases matches the actual
distribution.  As mentioned above, several variables (including the replacement rate
and the cause and type of injury) only impact denial probabilities through their effects
on the expected net benefit of denying a claim. Thus, to check model adequacy we
computed actual and predicted denial frequencies within replacement rate × gender ×
injury-cause × injury-type cells.  For simplicity, we grouped injury causes into two
groups (slip, other), injury types into three categories (dislocations, unknown, and
“other”), and replacement rates into two categories: less than two-thirds and greater
and equal to two-thirds.   Thus, we have a total of 24 (=2×2×2×3) cells.  The predicted
and actual numbers of denials in each cell are shown in Table 4.   Overall, the model
does a relatively good job of predicting the distribution of denials across cells: a simple
Chi-square statistic for the goodness of fit is 20.7 , which is below the expected value of
a Chi-squared variate with 23 degrees of freedom.25
As a second test of the structural model, we estimated the decision models of the
worker and the firm, allowing for separate coefficients on the sub-components of the
expected payoffs associated with each of the 3 final outcomes.  In particular, following
the specification of equation (6b), we included E1 and E2 with separate coefficients in the
model for the probability of contesting a denied claim.  At the same time, following
equation (7b), we included E3,  p
cE1, and (1!p
c)E2 with separate coefficients in the model
for the probability of denying a claim.  The resulting coefficient estimates are somewhat
imprecise, but the overall log likelihood of the model is not much different than the
likelihood for the more restrictive specification shown in Table 3.  In particular, the test
for the 3 implied restrictions in our structural model yields a Chi-square statistic of 2.4,
which has a probability value of 0.5. Thus, these restrictions are not rejected by the data.
Finally, we used the parameter estimates from our model to evaluate the effect of
imposing a penalty (or “tax”) on employers in the event that a denied claim was
contested and subsequently found valid, where we define the latter outcome as cases
where a denied and contested claim  resulted in a positive payout.  Specifically, we
assumed that if the claimant wins the claim dispute then the employer must pay the
claimant an additional $1000 . Assuming that this change has no effect on the other
parameters of the model, or on the distribution of injury claims filed by workers, our
structural estimates imply that the imposition of such a penalty would cause the denial
rate for back injury claims to decline from 10.8% to 5.7%, and would also lead to a
decline in the probability of a claimant contesting a denied claim, from 30% to 22%. The
average costs of accepted claims would decline from $6,730 to $6,334 while the average
costs of denied and contested claims would rise from $19,367 to 21,256 (excluding
penalty costs).  Thus, a tax on denials that are subsequently found to be valid would
lower the rate of litigation over liability, and cause a compositional shift that reduces
the number of lower-cost injuries that are litigated.  26
V. Conclusions
This paper presents a model of liability disputes in the workers’ compensation
system. A simple sequential asymmetric information model is developed and
structurally estimated using data from the state of Minnesota.  We find that employers
are more likely to deny liability for injury claims when their expected gains from doing
so are larger.  In particular, they are more likely to deny liability when faced by an
injury claimant who is less likely to “fight back” if denied.  Claimants, on the other
hand, are more likely to contest denied claims when their expected returns from
fighting back are larger.
For back claims, the structural model fit the data reasonably well, and provides a
relatively successful explanation for the distribution of liability disputes across different
injury classes.  Whether it would perform as well for other types of injury claims is left
for future research.  The model was tailored explicitly for the dispute system in
Minnesota.  Since WC laws and dispute procedures differ across states, it may not be
directly applicable to other states.  Moreover, because of data limitations, we only
modeled the first two steps of the dispute process and made no attempt to disentangle
the various factors governing subsequent stages of litigation.  Nevertheless, when richer
data become available, we believe it may prove fruitful to develop and estimate more
complete models of the dispute process that build on the model presented here.27
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                                                 Back Claims by Status:
                                         Back   ))))))))))))))))))))))))))
                          All Claims    Claims     Not Denied     Denied
                             (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)
)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
1.  Average Age             35.2         35.1         35.0         35.8
2.  Percent Female          31.0         32.6         32.3         35.0
3.  Percent Married         52.4         54.5         54.9         50.8
4.  Percent Blue Collar     60.6         58.6         58.4         60.5
5.  Average Weekly Wage      358          362          363          350
     
Industry (Percent):
6.  Construction            11.9         11.9         12.2          9.3
7.  Manufacturing           31.5         28.9         28.5         32.6
8.  Trade                   19.2         18.2         18.5         15.9
9.  Services                22.8         26.9         26.9         27.5
Insurance Carrier (Percent):
10. Self-Insured            20.6         21.5         21.2         24.2
11. State Fund               3.9          3.6          3.6          2.9
12. Assigned Risk Pool       7.4          6.7          6.0         12.2
Claim Status:
13. Percent Denied          10.8         10.7          0.0        100.0
14. Percent with            75.7         81.5         86.5         40.2
     Positive Payments
15. Average Payment        4,773        6,845        6,910        6,303
16. Average Payment,       6,309        8,396        7,991       15,687
     If Positive
17. Percent of Payments     77.7         76.4         78.3           42
     from Temporary
     Total Benefits
18. Number of Claims       23755         7437         6643          794
)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
Notes: Based on a 10 percent sample of worker compensation claims filed
       in the State of Minnesota from 1985 to 1989.  Payment amounts
       include all forms of benefits and stipulated sums. Table 2: Claim Characteristics by Nature and Cause of Injury
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                                                           Non-Denied Claims     Denied Claims               Denied Claim, No CP    Denied Claim, CP  
                                                 Average             Average             Average                         Average             Average
                  Percent of  Denial   Percent   Payment    Percent  Payment    Percent  Payment   File CP     Percent   Payment    Percent  Payment
                     Claims    Rate    Payment>0  if >0    Payment>0  if >0    Payment>0  if >0   if Denied   Payment>0   if >0   Payment>0   if >0
                      (1)       (2)      (3)       (4)        (5)      (6)        (7)      (8)       (9)        (10)      (11)       (12)     (13)
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All Injuries        100.0      10.7      81.5     8,396      86.5     7,991      40.2    15,687      27.1       25.4     5,943       73.7    18,956
Nature of Injury:
1. Strain            77.6       8.4      82.7     7,562      86.7     7,242      39.8    15,171      25.0       26.6     4,758       73.7    18,742
2. Dislocation        6.6      18.3      80.7    12,099      89.3    11,663      42.2    16,239      35.3       27.9     9,882       76.0    19,452
3. Unknown/          11.5      21.3      74.1    11,508      83.8    70,721      37.9    17,947      30.0       21.1     8,654       71.6    19,075
    Missing
4. All Others         4.2      11.7      80.4    10,512      84.2    10,422      51.4    11,619      21.1       24.1     2,666       80.3    19,517
Cause of Injury:
5. Miscell. Strain   30.7       7.9      82.8     7,284      86.9     7,077      33.9    13,491      24.7       26.3     5,053       73.2    18,006
6. Infection         10.1       6.4      88.2     4,510      90.7     4,448      52.1     6,088      23.1       30.3     3,575       74.8    14,548
7. Lifting/Reachin    9.8       6.9      81.0     7,871      84.2     7,544      38.0    17,636      29.6       28.1     5,285       72.6    20,310
8. Cut/Scrape         6.7       7.8      81.4     9,527      84.4     9,348      46.2    13,389      30.4       31.0     4,339       70.9    18,318
9. Unknown/          27.0      18.0      77.6    10,741      86.0    10,141      39.2    16,735      28.4       21.5     6,915       73.7    19,780
    Missing
10. All Others       15.7       9.9      82.0     9,293      85.8     8,657      47.0    19,937      27.1       30.9     7,160       75.9    18,960
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    Probability of         Probability of
    Denial Equation        Contest Equation
    ))))))))))))))))))    )))))))))))))))))))
   (1)   (2)
1. Discount Factor  1.611  7.868
(0.353) (2.283)
2. Log Weekly Wage  1.231       0.012
(0.451) (0.190)
3. In Assigned Risk Pool  0.534    -
(0.094)
4. Self-Insured  0.181    -
(0.070)
5. State Fund -0.170    -
(0.166)
6. Age    - -0.152
(0.058)
7. Age-squared/100    -    0.212
(0.077)




Accepted  Denied  Denied
           & Contested   & Not Contested
  (1)    (2)       (3)        
))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
1. Age  0.034  0.017  0.007
(0.009) (0.012) (0.044)
2. Age-squared/100 -0.035 -0.020  0.025
(0.012) (0.015) (0.053)
3. Female  0.032  0.006  0.082
(0.041) (0.025) (0.191)
4. Blue Collar  0.114 -0.017 -0.225
(0.038) (0.023) (0.177)
5. Log Weekly Wage  0.776   0.214  0.407
(0.082) (0.074) (0.425)
6. Dislocation  0.180  -0.043  0.276
(0.074) (0.035) (0.234)
7. Unknown Type    0.187  0.066  0.424
(0.066) (0.046) (0.324)
8. Slip    0.027  0.007 -0.387
(0.041) (0.024) (0.185)
9. Slip&Type Unknown  0.047 -0.134 -0.072
(0.107) (0.061) (0.421)
10. Rep. Rate > 1  0.511  0.346 -0.608
(0.216) (0.171) (2.369)
11. Rep. Rate = 1  0.070  0.329 -0.024
(0.138) (0.107) (0.648)
12. 0.67 < Rep. Rate < 1   0.055  0.262  0.199
(0.096) (0.078) (0.493)
13. Rep. Rate = .67 -0.035  0.164  0.257
(0.058) (0.045) (0.296)Table 3, continued
  Probability of Positive Cost Equations
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Accepted Denied Denied
           &Contested   & Not Contested
  (1)   (2)        (3)        
))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
1. Age  0.022  0.032 -0.001
(0.011) (0.013) (0.031)
2. Age-squared/100 -0.025 -0.052  0.003
(0.014) (0.016) (0.038)
3. Female  0.138 -0.019  0.160
(0.049) (0.050) (0.140)
4. Blue Collar  0.113  0.010 -0.086
(0.045) (0.046) (0.137)
5. Log Weekly Wage -0.247 -0.310  0.177
(0.099) (0.128) (0.291)
6. Dislocation  0.143  0.023 -0.097
(0.087) (0.070) (0.188)
7. Unknown Cause -0.056 -0.155 -0.202
(0.084) (0.087) (0.226)
8. Slip  0.001 -0.084 -0.101
(0.050) (0.052) (0.131)
9. Slip&Type Unknown -0.117  0.230 -0.075
(0.128) (0.113) (0.290)
10. Rep. Rate > 1 -0.731 -0.814  0.345
(0.275) (0.369) (0.745)
11. Rep. Rate = 1 -0.391 -0.735  0.386
(0.171) (0.218) (0.441)
12. 0.67 < Rep. Rate < 1 -0.184 -0.566  0.490
(0.120) (0.162) (0.334)





Notes: See text for explanation. Table 4: Actual and Predicted Denial Frequencies: Five Mass Point Estimates  
))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
Replacement  Rate        Gender        Cause         Type        Actual  Predicted
))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
Two-Thirds or Greater      Male    Non-Slip         Other          84     93.58
                                              Dislocation          28     27.85
                                                  Unknown          12     13.09
                                       Slip         Other          85     63.34
                      Dislocation          14     17.07
                                                  Unknown          35     38.15 
                         Female    Non-Slip         Other          94     93.84
                                              Dislocation           7      7.87
                                                  Unknown          10     12.86
                                       Slip         Other          40     38.74
                                              Dislocation           3      5.34
                                                  Unknown          36     32.09
Less Than Two-Thirds       Male    Non-Slip         Other         105    100.00     
                                              Dislocation          14     21.76
                                                  Unknown          20     17.36
                                       Slip         Other          53     66.87
                                              Dislocation          18     21.86
                                                  Unknown          48     46.26
                         Female    Non-Slip         Other          47     37.87
                                              Dislocation           4      5.42
                                                  Unknown           7      5.75
                                       Slip         Other          14     16.41
                                              Dislocation           2      3.06
                                                  Unknown          14     13.60
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log costs
Denied Claims
Notes: Based on a 10% random sample of all wokers' compensation claims filed in the State of Minnesota from 1985 to 1989.
Density estimates produced using kernel density estimation with a Gaussian kernel and bandwidth equal 0.30.
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log costs
Contested Claims
Notes: Based on a 10% random sample of all wokers' compensation claims filed in the State of Minnesota from 1985 to 1989.
Density estimates produced using kernel density estimation with a Gaussian kernel and bandwidth equal 0.30.
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Notes: Expected Gain of claim contesting based on a 100 percent sample of denied workers' compensation claims filed 
in the State of Minnesota from 1985 to 1989. Probability estimates produced using Lowess smoothing with a bandwidth equal to 2.0. 
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Notes: Expected Gain from claim Denial based on both the 100% sample of denied workers' compensation back claims filed and 10% random sample 
of all wokers' compensation claims filed in the State of Minnesota from 1985 to 1989. Probability estimates obtained using Lowess smoothing with a bandwidth equal to 2.0.




















































































Notes: Based on a 10% random sample of all wokers' compensation claims filed in the State of Minnesota from 1985 to 1989.
































































Notes: Based on a 10% random sample of all wokers' compensation claims filed in the State of Minnesota from 1985 to 1989.
























































Notes: Based on a 10% random sample of all wokers' compensation claims filed in the State of Minnesota from 1985 to 1989.
Figure 9: Denied and Not Contested ClaimsAppendix Table 1:  Simple (Unrestricted) Probit Models for Probabilities that Claim is
Denied, Worker Receives Positive Payments, and Worker Files Claim Petition 
))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
                       Normalized Coefficients from Probit Models for Probability of:
                                        Positive Payment:         Positive Payment if
                       Claim   Positive  If not    If      File    Claim Denied and:
                       denied  Payment   denied   denied    CP     No CP   CP filed 
                        (1)      (2)      (3)      (4)      (5)      (6)      (7)   
))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
 1. Age                0.005    0.003    0.005    0.008    0.015    0.003   -0.008
                      (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.006)
 2. Age-squared       -0.005   -0.003   -0.006   -0.009   -0.017   -0.004    0.009
    (/10)             (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.007)
 3. Married           -0.017    0.006   -0.009    0.049    0.028    0.039    0.029
                      (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.020)
 4. Female             0.015    0.028    0.031    0.007   -0.008    0.001    0.033
                      (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.023)
 5. Log Wage          -0.012   -0.024   -0.008   -0.022   -0.039   -0.004    0.015
                      (0.018)  (0.025)  (0.023)  (0.028)  (0.026)  (0.029)  (0.051)
 6. Blue Collar        0.019    0.010    0.017    0.064    0.039    0.053    0.029
                      (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.026)
 7. Rep. Rate > 1      0.131  -0.136   -0.042   -0.107  -0.075   -0.081   -0.002 
                      (0.088)  (0.089)  (0.074)  (0.070)  (0.061)  (0.066)  (0.145)
                     
 8. Rep. Rate = 1      0.065  -0.048   -0.006   -0.066   -0.044   -0.036   -0.035
                      (0.041)  (0.046)  (0.039)  (0.047)  (0.042)  (0.048)  (0.091)
 9. 0.67 < Rep.        0.025    0.005    0.015   -0.022   -0.011   -0.011   -0.015 
    < 1.0             (0.088)  (0.029)  (0.026)  (0.035)  (0.032)  (0.036)  (0.063)
10. Rep. Rate = .67    0.010   0.002    0.005   -0.019   -0.005   -0.009   -0.020  
                      (0.088)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.022)  (0.020)  (0.023)  (0.040)
  
Injury Type/Cause:
 11. Dislocation       0.107   -0.021    0.026    0.053    0.095    0.008    0.004
                      (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.028)
12. Unknown/Missing    0.047   -0.035   -0.010   -0.036    0.031   -0.068    0.001
     Injury Type      (0.018)  (0.021)  (0.019)  (0.029)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.039)
13. Slip               0.068   -0.033    0.002   -0.051    0.000   -0.073    0.019
                      (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.023)
14. Slip & Type        0.062   -0.066   -0.034    0.037    0.023    0.055   -0.063
    Unknown/Missing   (0.021)  (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.029)  (0.026)  (0.033)  (0.049)
))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
Note: table continues.Appendix Table 1, continued.
))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
                       Normalized Coefficients from Probit Models for Probability of:
                                        Positive Payment:         Positive Payment if
                       Claim   Positive  If not    If      File    Claim Denied and:
                       denied  Payment   denied   denied    CP     No CP   CP filed 
                        (1)      (2)      (3)      (4)      (5)      (6)      (7)   
))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
Insurer Type:
15. Self-Insured      0.029   -0.037   -0.020   -0.057   -0.063   -0.024   -0.039 
                     (0.010)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.027)
16. State Fund       -0.014    0.049    0.042   -0.082   -0.053   -0.067   -0.008
                     (0.017)  (0.021)  (0.019)  (0.028)  (0.024)  (0.027)  (0.054)
17. Assigned Risk     0.087   -0.020    0.026    0.051   -0.017    0.055    0.068
    Pool             (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.016)  (0.019)  (0.016)  (0.020)  (0.030)
18. Industry Effects   yes      yes      yes      yes      yes      yes      yes
     and Year Effects
19. Chi-squared        366.9   163.5    100.5    208.5    167.2    129.2     65.2
    (29 df)
))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
Note: standard errors in parentheses.Appendix Table 2:  Simple (Unrestricted) Linear Regression Models for Total Payment
Amounts and Payment Amount, Conditional on Positive Payments
))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
                           Linear Regression Coefficient Estimates for Models of:
                       Total   Payment   Total Payment if Payment > 0 ($1000):
                      Payment  if > 0     Not                Denied and:  
                      ($1000s) ($1000s)   Denied   Denied   No CP   CP filed
                        (1)      (2)      (3)      (4)      (5)      (6)         
))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
 1. Age                0.529    0.608    0.627    0.193    0.197    0.310
                      (0.130)  (0.157)  (0.160)  (0.089)  (0.189)  (0.357)
 2. Age-squared       -0.607   -0.694   -0.715   -1.584   -0.953   -1.644
    (/10)             (0.161)  (0.195)  (0.198)  (1.107)  (2.350)  (4.451)
 3. Married            0.496    0.703   -0.723    1.077   -0.013    2.182
                      (0.479)  (0.575)  (0.585)  (0.329)  (0.691)  (1.218)
 4. Female             0.517    0.467    0.357    0.149   -0.163    0.474
                      (0.599)  (0.732)  (0.746)  (0.382)  (0.815)  (1.507)
 5. Log Wage           4.042    5.717    5.413    0.235    2.367    2.239
                      (1.248)  (1.525)  (1.554)  (0.792)  (1.650)  (3.138)
 6. Blue Collar        0.575    0.551    0.440    1.268    0.408    1.452
                      (0.625)  (0.757)  (0.769)  (0.412)  (0.856)  (1.580)
 7. Rep. Rate > 1      2.893   5.535    5.434   -3.876    3.311  -11.459 
                      (3.385)  (4.126)  (4.191)  (2.239)  (4.579)  (9.073)
                     
 8. Rep. Rate = 1     -0.093   0.892    0.918   -3.531    1.378  -11.258
                      (2.077)  (2.517)  (2.567)  (1.379)  (2.853)  (5.317)
 9. 0.67 < Rep.       -1.197   -1.037   -1.124   -2.459    2.272   -9.912 
    < 1.0             (1.475)  (1.788)  (1.823)  (0.989)  (1.998)  (3.815)
10. Rep. Rate = .67   -1.410  -1.489   -1.205   -1.891    1.764   -7.572   
                      (0.898)  (1.086)  (1.103)  (0.636)  (1.274)  (2.421)
Injury Type/Cause:
11. Dislocation        2.225    3.151    3.043    1.750    4.646   -0.457
                      (0.911)  (1.102)  (1.143)  (0.499)  (1.037)  (1.667)
12. Unknown/Missing    3.313    4.461    4.953    0.770    4.644    0.214
     Injury Type      (0.982)  (1.197)  (1.898)  (0.630)  (1.374)  (2.356)
13. Slip               1.862    2.499    2.489    0.172    0.466    0.829
                      (0.563)  (0.683)  (0.697)  (0.368)  (0.784)  (1.385)
14. Slip and Type     -3.467   -2.864    4.954   -0.019   -1.254   -0.382
    Missing/Unknown   (1.435)  (1.806)  (1.215)  (0.800)  (1.790)  (2.956)
))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
Note: table continues.Appendix Table 2, continued.
))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
                           Linear Regression Coefficient Estimates for Models of:
                       Total   Payment   Total Payment if Payment > 0 ($1000):
                      Payment  if > 0     Not                Denied and:  
                      ($1000s) ($1000s)   Denied   Denied   No CP   CP filed




15. Self-Insured      -2.202   -2.404   -2.610   -1.815   -1.417   -1.572 
                      (0.605)  (0.735)  (0.746)  (0.410)  (0.875)  (1.678)
16. State Fund        -1.652   -2.506   -2.412   -1.708    2.839   -4.845
                      (1.229)  (1.448)  (1.465)  (0.839)  (1.951)  (3.296)
17. Assigned Risk      1.208    1.769    1.434   -0.378   -0.997   -0.659
    Pool              (0.925)  (1.128)  (1.171)  (0.527)  (0.998)  (1.870)
18. Industry Effects    yes      yes      yes      yes      yes      yes
     and Year Effects
19. R-squared          0.042    0.053   0.053    0.035    0.062    0.085
))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
Note: standard errors in parentheses.